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SYMPOSIUM ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION TO CRIMINALIZE MARITAL RAPE 
 
ZERO-TOLERANCE COMES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Aya Gruber* 
It is difficult to engage from a theoretical perspective an advocacy piece that largely reads like a brief  in 
favor of  particular claim of  law, namely, that a state’s failure to (vigorously) criminalize marital rape violates 
international human rights law. In a brief, the litigant pulls together various sources to prove the legal claim is 
correct. Opponents typically respond by cobbling together their own sources to undermine that claim. In 
their essay, Criminalizing Sexual Violence Against Women in Intimate Relationships, Randall and Venkatesh set out to 
prove that international human rights law, in fact, requires states to criminalize marital rape.1 I suspect there are 
international lawyers who can persuasively argue that international human rights law does not, in fact, require 
such criminalization. 
The challenge is to separate the authors’ theory from their strategy. Clearly, they have concluded that wom-
en all over the world would benefit from their governments prosecuting intimates for marital rape (defined as 
sex without “affirmative consent”)2 and that international human rights law is a good tool for compelling 
such government action. But one wonders whether the authors have elsewhere developed a convincing 
theory that a one-size-fits-all criminal approach to combating gender violence is better than local strategies 
tailored to the conditions of  a particular place. One wonders whether the authors have calculated that the 
rightful concern for private men’s power over women trumps other power differentials that may be exacer-
bated by their proposal―global North over global South, militarized over weak nation, government over 
citizen, police over individual, neoliberalism over distributive justice. One wonders whether the authors have 
grappled with the sociological and legal literature on how anti-gender-violence carceral schemes operate on 
the ground (and can disserve the women they are meant to aid).3 Have the authors simply made a strategic 
choice to advance a straightforward criminalization-everywhere argument because acknowledging complexity 
would ensure legal defeat? 
 
* Professor of  Law, University of  Colorado Law School. 
Originally published online 17 May 2016. 
1 Melanie Randall & Vasanthi Venkatesh, Criminalizing Sexual Violence against Women in Intimate Relationships: State Obligations Under 
Human Rights Law, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 189, 190 (2015). 
2 Id. at 194. 
3 Cf. Prabha Kotiswaran, Born Unto Brothels-Toward A Legal Ethnography of  Sex Work in an Indian Red-Light Area, 33 LAW & SOC. IN-
QUIRY 579 (2008); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE (2012). 
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The Brief 
In legal briefs, progressives sometimes make originalist arguments, feminists sometimes rely on stereotypi-
cal views of  gender, and liberals sometimes embrace expansive state authority. Such strategic legal arguments 
can be costly, and therefore merit scrutiny. Feminist advocacy on transnational gender violence follows a 
surprisingly consistent pattern: (1) identify a broad, complex, and divergent set of  behaviors as a type of  
brutal “violence against women,” often shorthanded as VAW, (2) publicize statistics demonstrating the now-
labeled phenomenon is widespread, perhaps an “epidemic” (aggregating broad, complex, and divergent 
behavior permits this), and (3) prescribe state-sponsored criminal enforcement―backed by the threat of  
international censure, economic sanction, or even military intervention―as the necessary and appropriate 
solution to the crisis.4 The authors to some extent adopt this strategy. They note that intimate partner vio-
lence is “the most common” form of  VAW, that one in four women experience intimate partner “sexual 
violence,” and that many “assaulted women” are “forced into sex” by intimates.5 From this, they quickly 
transition to a condemnation of  states (50 percent of  them) that “do not explicitly criminalize sexual assault 
in marriage” and others that “retain exemptions” for spouses.6 Lack of  adequate criminalization, in turn, 
“condones” and even “facilitates” the private violence.7 
There are benefits and costs to this advocacy strategy. Calls to punish bad actors and spectacular narratives 
are persuasive and get things done, which can be good. Strong anti-marital-rape laws might improve women’s 
lives in, say, rural Uganda. (Then again, they might not.) But this rhetorical strategy also defines away the 
possibility of  addressing women’s inequality in local, diverse, and nonpunitive ways: Being against VAW 
means being for criminal intervention. Those who do not support criminalization are not just nonfeminist, 
they are rape enablers. The empirical question of  whether criminal law does actually reduce sexual violence 
(or the lack thereof  promotes it) is entirely beside the point. To care about women’s safety and equality is, by 
definition, to support state violence directed against bad male actors. This ups the ante for a community that 
wants to devote its scarce resources toward economic programs for women rather than policing men, or for a 
feminist sociologist who wants to expose how criminal law made women in a certain community worse off. 
The rhetoric of  feminist advocacy casts such communities and theorists in an ignoble lot with groups that 
forthrightly condone rape. The result is to discourage the open-minded from engaging in the conversation at 
all. Accordingly, like much of  globalization, globalized feminism leaves out alternative perspectives and can 
create theoretically, analytically, and empirically impoverished policies. 
All that said, the authors’ strategy is less crisis-speak than legal formalism. The essay largely identifies in-
ternational instruments directing governments to secure a certain right through criminal law, argues that 
martial rape implicates that right, and concludes that international law requires marital rape criminalization. 
Some of  these arguments, however, have disturbing implications. For example, the essay asserts that because 
marital rape threatens the nonderogable “right to life,” states must adequately criminally prohibit it.8   
Why exactly does marital sex without affirmative consent amount to deprivation of  the right to life? One 
answer is purely formal: Because courts have recognized rape and domestic violence as violations of  the right 
to life, “rape in spousal relationships, by extension, necessarily also violates that right.”9 But there is no hint as 
 
4 See Aziza Ahmed, Trafficked? AIDS, Criminal Law and the Politics of  Measurement, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 96, 109 (2015). Cf. Sally Engle 
Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY (SUPP. 3) S83, S85 (2011). 
5 Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 1, at 189. 
6 Id. at 189-90. 
7 Id. at 190. 
8 Id. at 191. 
9 Id. 
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to which forms of  domestic violence and rape violate the right to life and why. Does noninjurious coercive 
control or sex without consent count? Does any harm that one individual might cause to another “implicate” 
the right to life?10 Is the threshold for depriving life different for men and women, for intimates and noninti-
mates? Elsewhere, the authors assert that international law defines (any) violence against women as 
“torture.”11 The authors cite an international study concluding that nations should “treat all forms of  violence 
against women and girls as criminal offenses.”12 Under the mantle of  formal equality, the authors advocate a 
framework of  state obligation to inflict punishment on any private person for any violence, no matter how 
slight, with only the caveat that the victim is female. The inherent violence of  criminal punishment, the 
violence of  masculinist and corrupt police who execute criminal programs, and the violence of  states that 
respond to spectacular private VAW by devolving to retaliatory punishment regimes merit less concern.13 
The second answer to why failure to criminalize marital rape violates the right to life is substantive. The 
authors argue that marital rape can cause “miscarriages, fistulas, and the contraction of  potentially fatal 
sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV.”14 Are the authors arguing that the “right to life” necessitates 
criminal laws directed at preventing fetal termination and stemming sexual transmission of  AIDS?15 Sex, 
unconsensual and consensual, in and out of  a relationship, can cause miscarriages, fistulas, and disease. In-
deed, the risk of  unwanted pregnancy or STD might be greater for those who have consensual-yet-causal sex 
than those who have unconsensual sex within marriage. Similarly, the protection of  fetal and maternal life 
could be used to justify antiabortion laws or state regulation of  women’s reproductive health-related behav-
ior.16 I do not deny that unconsensual marital sex, in addition to all its other problems, carries the risks of  sex 
in general (STDs/AIDS) and to women in particular (pregnancy, complications). However, it seems unwise to 
equate individual acts that expose others to risks such as miscarriage and STDs with deprivations of  the right 
to life. 
The Normative Case 
Notwithstanding the authors’ legal case that international law in fact mandates states to criminalize marital 
rape, there remains the question of  whether such a mandate is desirable. To be sure, marital rape is destruc-
tive and reflects and reinforces patriarchy. Nevertheless, strategies for responding to marital rape should 
depend on the nature of  the problem in the state where it arises. Consider Sweden, for example, where 
despite women’s achievement of  near equality, rape rates appear disproportionately high.17 When the feminist 
critique of  Sweden’s lax rape enforcement emerged several years ago, civil libertarians worried that it might 
move this highly egalitarian nation with a progressive penal system to follow the lead of  other European 
 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. (quoting Secretary General, In-depth study on all forms of  violence against women, paras. 112-113 UN Doc. 
A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006) (emphasis added). 
13 See Neha Thirani, Debating the Death Penalty for Rape in India, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Dec. 28, 2012); Alissa J. Rubin, Flawed Justice After a 
Mob Killed an Afghan Woman, N.Y. Times (Dec. 26, 2015). 
14 Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 1, at 191. 
15 See Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in the Context of  HIV/aids: Consequences for Women's Health, 34 HARV. J. L. & GEN-
DER 225, 228 (2011). 
16 Cf. Álvaro Paúl, Controversial Conceptions: The Unborn and the American Convention on Human Rights, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 209, 
210 (2012). See Andrea D. Friedman, Bad Medicine: Abortion and the Battle over Who Speaks for Women’s Health, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 45, 46 (2013). 
17 Ruth Alexander, Sweden’s rape rate under the spotlight, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Sept. 15, 2012). 
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states that had become increasingly punitive.18 Today, we can add concerns about how feminist critique of  
rape permissiveness might dovetail with the anti-immigrant sentiments of  the far right.19  
In the United States, marital rape is a subset of  the larger domestic violence (DV) problem, for which most 
Americans already profess zero tolerance.20 Today, every state in the United States has exceptional pro-
prosecution rules for DV, ranging from mandatory arrest to no-drop policies. DV arrests typically result in 
multiple misdemeanor charges against defendants, often followed by guilty pleas in exchange for probation or 
short jail sentences, setting in motion a revolving door scenario involving unemployment, break-up and 
reconciliation, issues with children, loss of  subsidized housing, and possible deportation.21 Sometimes this 
cycle is good, for example, if  jail induces the abuser to reform or empowers the woman to become independ-
ent. Often it is not, and today many feminist commentators regard zero-tolerance DV policies with a healthy 
degree of  skepticism. 
Within this system, criminalization of  marital rape may increase the power of  prosecutors to compel guilty 
pleas because they can threaten a serious felony charge. But prosecutors hardly need more leverage securing 
DV plea bargains. Indeed, charging marital rape will not incentivize (and may further disincentivize) reluctant 
victims to report and testify about abuse. Further, broad criminalization of  marital rape has the potential to 
affect people who are not in abusive relationships. A regime requiring affirmative consent for each instance 
of  marital sex will render a lot of  sex between married people criminal.22 Some of  this prohibited sex will 
occur in abusive relationships, but some will not. Some of  the sex will be forcible or otherwise repugnant, but 
some will not. We might hope that the affirmative consent regime will deter forcible sex, without affecting 
married people who engage in acceptable sex-without-a-yes. However, married women who experience 
coerced/forcible/repugnant sex generally have remedies under existing laws. Thus, in the United States, 
outside of  DV cases, lack-of-affirmative consent legal claims may arise most frequently in the context of  
nasty divorces.  
Finally, marital rape might be an issue of  the developing world (or segments of  the developed world), 
where oppressed women are forced to enter into horrible marriages, marked by violence, dependence, and 
lack of  alternatives. Sex occurs in these marriages, not to mention pregnancy, child bearing, and back-
breaking domestic labor. This is what the authors appear to envision in their passionate calls for criminaliza-
tion. Nevertheless, generally criminalizing sex-without-affirmative-consent within marriage seems like a 
questionable method of  addressing forced marriage, when compared with other proposals.23 First, express 
consent is meaningless when compulsion is omnipresent.24 Moreover, many of  these women are subject to 
“structural gender inequalities,” as the authors recognize.25 It is hard to imagine that a woman who faces 
“ongoing threats of  violence, dishonor, or stigma; removal of  economic support and shelter; polygamy; and 
other social pressures” will somehow be moved by rape law to finally seek state assistance against her hus-
 
18 Apparently, Sweden did pass new rape laws, but did not generally become more punitive. See Sweden tests rape law amid surge of  
attacks, THE LOCAL (Dec. 4, 2013); Erwin James, Why is Sweden closing its prisons?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2013). 
19 See Sue Reid, Torn apart by an open door for migrants: Sweden is seen as Europe’s most liberal nation, but violent crime is soaring and the Far Right 
is on the march, THE DAILY MAIL (Nov. 13, 2015). 
20 See GOODMARK, supra note 3; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007). 
21 See GOODMARK, supra note 3; Gruber, supra note 20. 
22 People often signal consent nonverbally rather than affirmatively. See Terry P. Humphreys & Mélanie M. Brousseau, The Sexual 
Consent Scale–Revised: Development, Reliability, and Preliminary Validity, 47 J. SEX RES. 420, 421 (2010) (citing studies). 
23 See New Research from the Population Council Shows Child Marriage Can Be Delayed, POPULATION COUNCIL (Aug. 12, 2015).  
24 See Robin West, Martial Rape, Consent, and Human Rights: Comment on “Criminalizing Sexual Violence against Women in Intimate Relation-
ships”, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 197 (2015).  
25 Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 1, at 195. 
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band, especially given the embarrassment of  sexual disclosure.26 In addition, faith in corrupt and sexist police 
forces to fairly enforce such laws and not penalize women seems misplaced. Perhaps the authors envision a 
regime that cabins police discretion through mandatory arrest and prosecution provisions, but such provi-
sions may produce more backlash than change and harm the economically/socially dependent women forced 
to prosecute. Thus, victim-initiated rape prosecution seems an unpromising avenue of  state intervention in 
forced marriage.   
The three situations described above are all bad, but they are different. And one can question whether rigor-
ous marital rape prosecution will helpfully address the harms involved. I have played out these scenarios as 
hypotheticals, and there is a possibility that the authors have an evidence-informed sense of  the likely distri-
butional effects of  their proposal in a multiplicity of  scenarios. But I suspect not. Criminalization occupies a 
privileged space in feminist reform efforts, and concerns over racialized mass incarceration and reform’s 
“unintended effects” on marginalized people are simply a footnote―a brief  caveat in the push for criminal 
laws that are “necessary to signal” condemnation of  VAW.27 But this “expressivist” argument grants virtually 
unfettered authority to states to enact illiberal, discriminatory, and disproportional punishment schemes on 
the ground that those schemes communicate “strong condemnation” of  individual bad behavior.28 Moreover, 
policing and prosecution regimes express other messages, such as “racial and political . . . message[s] about 
who is in control and about who gets controlled” and messages about the nature of  crime as matter of  
individual violence rather than of  larger social and economic inequality.29 
The authors characterize criminalization as “only a first step” in addressing the problem, with a later step 
being no less than “the eradication of  institutional and cultural structures, practices, and norms that entrench 
male dominance.”30 But it seems that eradicating patriarchy is a much better, though more difficult, pursuit 
than “message-sending” criminalization. In certain communities, criminalization will undermine women’s 
material well-being. In certain communities, police and prosecutors are a large part of  the “institutional and 
cultural structures, practices, and norms that entrench male dominance.”31 Given criminal law’s built-in costs, 
why do the authors regard it as a remedy of  first resort—as “the only way that women’s universal rights to 
security and liberty are meaningfully protected”?32   
Criminal law theorizing often manifests a “punitive impulse” reflecting cultural inculcation that “criminal 
law [i]s a legitimate, if  not the preferred, response to harms attributable to bad individuals.” This impulse 
“can lead even those who, as a philosophical matter question state authority . . . [to] embrace punitivity for 
whatever they consider true harm.”33 However, the less feminism tolerates weak criminal enforcement against 
bad individual actors, the more it tolerates hypermasculine policing and punishment. The more it tolerates 
war―the ultimate manifestation of  male dominance―waged in the name of  the responsibility to protect 
women from bad men. I hope that conversations like this one will open up a space where feminist commit-
ment to antisubordination and nonviolence is measured, not by the strength of  one’s anger, condemnation, or 
authoritarianism, but by one’s openness to exploring the many and heterodox ways to effect positive change. 
 
26 Id. at 196.  
27 Id. at 195. 
28 Id. See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CAL. L. REV. 273 (2015) (critiquing expressivism). 
29 Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral Limits of  the Criminal Law 
and The Expressive Function of  Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 168 (2001). 
30 Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 1, at 196. 
31 Id. at 195. 
32 Id. at 194.   
33 Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3223 
(2015). 
